把律師和委託人的利益結合起來

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clints

眾所周知，律師與委託人之間存在潛在衝突。如果一位律師的收入只與他所付出的時間相關而與案件的結果無關，那麼律師可能會希望將案件提起訴訟，即便是提起訴訟並不符合委託人的最佳利益，律師也可能會在該案件上耗費比委託人所期望的更多的工作時間，也可能在和解對於委託人更為有利的時候反對和解。反之，如果律師是根據傳統的風險代理收費方式來獲得報酬－－根據這種收費方式，他只能獲得判決所得或者和解所得的一部分，卻必須承擔所有的訴訟成本－－那麼，律師可能沒有什麼動力將案件提起訴訟，或即便提起訴訟的話也可能會花很少的時間在該案件上，也可能當提起訴訟對於委託人來說更為有利的時候卻鼓勵他們進行和解。在這篇論文中，我們提出一種支付律師報酬的方式，這種方式能夠克服律師和委託人之間的利益衝突。我們的方式是傳統風險代理收費方式的一種變體，但是相比於傳統風險代理收費方式來說，我們將會使律師僅僅承擔訴訟成本的一部分。同樣，律師在判決所得或者和解所得中也只能獲得一部分回報。我們證明，當律師所承擔的成本份額等於他能夠從判決中所得或者和解中所獲得的回報份額，那麼他就有動力完全按照一個有見地(knowledgeable)的委託人對他的期望來開展工作，比如在是否將案件提起訴訟、在案件上花費多少時間以及是否對案件進行和解等方面。根據我們的改良風險代理收費方式，協力廠商將償付律師費用的一部分，作為回報，律師將事先支付給該第三方一筆費用。通過這種方式，即便案件敗訴了，委託人也不用像傳統風險代理收費方式那樣承擔任何費用。

The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement-- under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation-- the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation-- the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case is lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system.