英文摘要 |
The Internet makes marketers can reach consumers in different geographic areas at a low cost. Furthermore, some consumers (henceforth online shoppers) only consider purchasing online due to their time constraints or prohibitively high shopping cost. This paper attempts to analyze how the existence of online shoppers influences the channel and pricing strategies of a monopolistic firm. Following previous research, the online channel allows consumers to save their shopping cost while the traditional channel allows the firm to provide presale services at point of sales. We assume there are two segments of consumers: the segment of online shoppers, and that of multichannel shoppers, who consider purchasing through both channels. Furthermore, each segment consists of high-valuation (highs) and low-valuation consumers (lows), who differ in their valuations to the firm’s product, and in their needs for presale services. We obtain the following results. First, although the existence of online shoppers makes the online channel become a necessary distribution channel, the traditional channel allows the firm to implement price discrimination and hence may be chosen despite its inefficiency. Second, the targeting strategies for multi-channel shoppers are restricted by the relative importance of presale services to the highs and to the lows. In particular, serving multi-channel shoppers in the high segment online and those in the low segment offline is feasible only if the highs have lower needs for presale services than the lows. Third, the targeting strategies for multi-channel shoppers also influence the price differential across distribution channels. For this reason, the firm may sacrifice efficiency for better screening. For example, to alleviate the cannibalization problem across channels, the firm may induce multi-channel shoppers of the highs to purchase through an inefficient online channel so that it can charge a higher price at the traditional channel to the lows. Finally, when the highs need more presale services and have the higher willingness to pay online than the lows, the higher the fraction of online shoppers in the high-valuation segment relative to that in the low-segment, the higher the benefits of price-discrimination, thus increasing the likelihood of giving up low-valuation online shoppers. |