宣告銀行貸款公司的盈餘管理、產品市埸競爭性與長期績效

Earnings Management, Product Market Competition, and Long-run Performance of Bank Loan Announcing Firms

本研究以美國1997 年至2005 年間689 家宣告向銀行貸款的公司為樣本，探討公司在向銀行貸款前是否有盈餘管理行為，以及此盈餘管理是否可以解釋公司在向銀行貸款後的長期績效不佳。實證結果顯示，公司在向銀行貸款前，會利用裁決性流動應計項目來虛增盈餘；而此盈餘管理對貸款公司長期績效有顯著的負向影響。再則，本研究討論在不同產業競爭程度下，貸款公司盈餘管理與其長期績效的關聯性，實證結果發現處於低競爭產業的公司，在貸款前有較高的盈餘管理，且此盈餘管理對長期績效有顯著的負向影響；而處於高競爭產業的公司，貸款前的盈餘管理並不顯著，而盈餘管理對長期績效並不具解釋能力。

Based on 689 U.S. bank loan announcement samples during 1997 to 2005, this study examines whether the borrowing firms manipulate earnings before bank loan announcement and whether the earnings management explains the borrowing firms’ post-announcing underperformance. The empirical results show that the borrowing firms typically have an upward earnings management (EM) before bank loan announcement, and this prior EM is negatively related to the long-run post-announcing stock and operating performance. Furthermore, this study also analyzes the effect of product market competition on the relation between EM and long-run performance of bank loan financing firms. The borrowing firms that operate in less competitive industries have higher levels of EM and the EM is significantly and negatively associated with the long-run performance. However, sample firms that operate in more competitive industries have insignificant EM and the EM is unrelated to the long-run performance.