中文摘要 |
西耶斯並非決斷主義制憲權觀的源頭。在他的理論體系中,制憲權僅限於決定政制,而人權作為價值規範是其前提和目標。制憲權的至上性只是相對於憲制權而言,它服從於國民主權原則之下的代表制,且蘊含以勞動分工為基礎的分配正義。大革命之后,西耶斯意識到制憲權的危險並將其掩藏,構想了憲法審查會以實現違憲審查、憲法改良和人權的終極保障。我國”政法憲法學”與”規範憲法學”的主張者在論戰中各執制憲權與人權,但都忽視了西耶斯這個重要的理論源頭。特別是前者在闡釋西氏的制憲權理論時切斷了與人權的關聯,將制憲權的客體從政制擴大到政治體本身,將規於主義替換為決斷主義,忽視憲法在民主正當性之外的規於正當性。”政治憲法學”應當以積極姿態有效地融入人權話語,從而走出理論泥淖。The Abbe' Sieyes is not the source of political decisionism conception of constituent power. In his doctri-nal picture, constituent power is limited to determine the political sturcture whose precondition and purpose are human right It has supremacy but only over the constituted powers. Being subject to the representative regime ruled by the national sovereignty principle, constituenet power contains the distributive justice princi-ple based on labor division. After the Great Revolution, Sieyes realized the danger of constituent power therefore froze it , then conceived jury constitutionnaire as an institution of constitutional review, constitu-tional reform and ultimeate human rights guardian. In their contemporary debate, the political constitutional law academy arms itself with constituent power and while normative constitutional law academy sticks to hu-man rights, but both of then neglect Sieyes. In particular, the political constitutional law academy isolates sieyes constituent power from his human rights theory, extends the object of constituent power form political structure to the political body itself, replaces Sieyes normativism with decisionism, and buries itself in the democratic legitimacy of constitution yet ignoring the normative legitimacy. The political constitutional law a-cademy should effectively participate in human rights dialogue, in order to get itself out of the moral abyss cademy should effectively participate in human rights dialogue , in order to get itself out of the moral abyss. |