英文摘要 |
From the beginning of 2013, with the decline of China’s growth, people around the world has started to pay a lot of attention to the financial risks in China, focusing on the increase of local government financing platform debt, the rapid expansion of the shadow banking system, and the growing real estate bubble. At same time, the term “Chinese Financial Crisis” began being used widely without clear definition, causing confusion. This study aims to reexamine the three main financial risks mentioned above in China from a fresh perspective that focuses on whether or not they contain some unique Chinese elements. The main conclusion of this study is that the aforementioned risks are just symptoms; the real weaknesses of China’s financial system are the monopoly power of the Chinese central government over resources, and the unhealthy appetite for rapid economic growth and overdependence on loans of Chinese local governments. Also, the “four trillion stimulus package” carried out by the Chinese central government after the global financial crisis in 2008 has caused serious excess liquidity problem, which in turn has triggered lots of “symptoms” of a financial crisis. The solutions for China to avoid a Chinese Financial Crisis are to change its development model, modify the central and local government functions, and accelerate market-oriented reforms. |