美國對臺海兩岸關係的偏差動員分析

The Mobilization of Bias by the U.S. toward the Cross-strait Relation

台海兩岸關係受到美國對中關係正常化政策影響至深。不論在台海安全、對台非正式關係之產生、轉變與發展，以及對台軍售等，甚至在國格獨立發展上，都使台灣對外關係產生重大拖滯影響。本文主旨是冀求提供總體宏觀的偏差動員的決策概念，能對美國總統與政府各部門與中國及台灣政府溝通、協商、談判所共構出的動態決策結果與模式，探討出更全面深入的瞭解，並提出日後台灣對外因應可行之途徑，以使有利於台灣未來在推動自己的外交目標時，能更順利達成。本文以Elmer Eric Schattsneider 的「偏差動員」概念，並以啟動對中關係正常化政策的尼克森，到福特及完成美中建交公報的卡特三位總統為研究範圍，探討渠等在全球變局中，以其各自對國安會、國務院、中情局與國防部等各部門與國會在組織與制度在聯結各層次行為的網絡關係之偏差與偏動員下，從其等對中主張、政策、措施、規則、程序、組織、制度、法規等在對中關係正常化推動中，所隱含對台灣等相關行為者之間的利害得失關係，進而提出發現與因應之道。

The U.S. President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) tried to go through the concept of multi-polarity of the world to counter-fight the wildness of the Soviet Union's hegemonic expansion everywhere of the world。He proposed to normalize the relations with China in secret diplomacy, with “two Chinas” as a transitional measurement, in order to establish the formal diplomatic relations as his final settlement of the goal in combining well with PRC's requirement of “One China's Principle.” But, the most difficult situation of the normalization was to tackle the issue of the U.S.-Taiwan relations. In Taiwan there were still many of the U.S. strategic national interests, such as in maintaining the stability of the western Pacific area, and deterring the potential aggression by use of force from the rising regional power of Communist China. President Nixon also knew “abandoning Taiwan” was “domestic political suicide”, he could not afford to the risk in his presidential term to publicly antagonize the congressmen who supported Taiwan, public opinions still in favor of supporting Taiwan and political rivalries at his back always in preparing to find opportunities to expel him out of his office. He was always under the threats of the medias to leak out his details in procession of “mobilization of bias” (MOB) in tackling the normalization relations with PRC. Finally, he reached the agreement with the PRC signing the “Shanghai Communique” in his stage, and established the liaison office in Peijing, but without abandoning Taiwan officially in his way of MOB. President Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977) faced even worse dilemma. He tried also in Nixon's patterns of way to promote the normalization with PRC, but Nixon's “Watergate Scandal” had deteriorated the political accountability of the successor of the presidency. President Ford had to be even more cautiously to make efforts in MOB to process the normalization relations with PRC in preventing from criticism which would lose the support of his reelection. But he still delayed his oral commitment of establishing official relations with PRC secretly in his term, and did not abandon the official relations with Taiwan. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) advocated human right diplomacy and understood his situation was not better than previous Nixon and Ford's administrations, the domestic political encountering still in minority of supporting the U.S.-PRC normalization, which were with the precondition of severance of diplomatic relations, retreating U.S. troops, and abrogation of mutual defense treaty with Taiwan proposed by PRC. But Carter in his faith determined to proceed to terminate the official relations with Taiwan, which agreed to the PRC “the Three Points”. He kept continuously in normalization relations with PRC to implement the goal of fully official relations in his ways of MOB, after his advocacy of signing “the Panama Canal Treaty”, which was in completion of passing by the U.S. Congress. He believed through his movements of MOB the normalization relation with PRC would result in the same as he did the previous case of “Panama Canal Treaty”. The text of the research in the approach of MOB is trying to get the insight of the details of the above mentioned three U.S. Presidents' movements of MOB from1969-1979' and analyze how they implemented to their goals in their secret processing of Normalization Relations with PRC respectively.