探討哈伯瑪斯的「審議」學說對「直接民主」之態度：一個透過卡爾．施密特「憲法學」之反省

Investigating Habermas's Attitude towards the 'Direct Democracy' in his Deliberative Theory: A Reflection via Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Doctrine

由二十世紀九十年代起，民主的理論與實踐經歷了一個「審議的轉向」，「審議民主」成為當代之顯學；而哈伯瑪斯也提出了自己的審議理論並廣受矚目。本文將指出：審議民主的實踐可以有多種模式，哈伯瑪斯乃其中之一。因此本文欲探討哈伯瑪斯為什麼選擇此一模式之原因，並解釋他嘗試建構一個能夠保留自由主義與共和主義之長處、排除兩者之短處的審議學說；而「如何避免共和主義可能衍生的危險」更是對他選擇審議之模式影響重大，而這種危險正好體現在卡爾‧施密特（Carl Schmitt）的憲法學說中。本文藉此進路，解釋哈伯瑪斯為什麼如此選擇、及探討「審議民主」是否只應限於哈伯瑪斯所主張的模式。

Since the 1990s the democratic theory has experienced a 'deliberative turn'. Consequently, the 'deliberative democracy' has been in the fore of the academic discussion. In the meantime Habermas also constructed his own doctrine of the deliberation that quickly drew wide attention. This paper wants to point out that the practice of the deliberative democracy allows various models. That is to say, Habermas's model is just one of them. The paper intends to investigate the reason why Habermas chooses a specific kind of deliberation, and explain that his doctrine tries to keep the merits of the 'liberalism' and 'republicanism', and dump the defects of the both. The consideration 'how to avoid the danger of republicanism' played a decisive role in the choosing of the model of deliberation. Such a danger is just crystallized in the constitutional doctrine of Carl Schmitt. Therefore, the paper tries to explain the choice of Habermas through the illustration of Schmitt's doctrine. In addition, it will question whether the practice of the deliberative democracy should be confined to the model of Habermas.