英文摘要 |
Successful sale/lease of industrial park properties depends on government's ability to attract investors. The reason why the government's subsidy policies failed to facilitate sale/lease of industrial park properties in Tainan Technology Industrial Park (TTIP) should be thoroughly investigated. Therefore, the study explores what institutional changes are required to promote public-private partnerships in industrial park management in terms of game theory. In addition, how institutions complement each other is also discussed. This study takes TTIP as an example and discusses companies' decision to move into TTIP based on an extension of Hotelling's model (spatial game theory). Following are summary of findings and conclusions. First, the government's division of work in industrial park management is the foundation for industry development. Its winning strategies, however, only focus on high-tech companies. Second, the government's industrial park management and property sale/lease strategies attend to land price subsidy but ignore non-pricing strategies, giving rise to dilemma about sale or lease. Meanwhile, government's strategies do influence companies' decision to move into TTIP (to optimize operations) among which customer transfer is key to site selection. Third, companies' site selection strategies in TTIP show their pursuit of optimal scale, use of complementary institutions to develop new business opportunities and seeking for vertical disintegration in value chain and technological progress. |