英文摘要 |
Could there be intrinsic finks for a disposition? Or, could there be any intrinsically finkable disposition (IFD)? These questions regarding intrinsic finks are important for the studies of dispositions because the adequacy of dispositional accounts of various notions depends on whether or not the dispositions in question can be intrinsically finked. In recent work, Clarke (2008, 2010) and Everett (2009) argue that some dispositions are intrinsically finkable. However, Choi (2012, 2013) raises three objections to this position. In order to respond to Choi's seemingly plausible objections, Tugby (2016) explicates the intuition that some particular cases are cases of IFD in terms of causal explanation, and further offers an ascription principle for IFD. In this paper, I argue that Tugby's argument for the ascription principle for IFD is not conclusive due to his debatable supposition of causality. Furthermore, I argue that the advocates of IFD encounter the problem of ontological inflation. |