英文摘要 |
Existing studies on the correlation between democracy and the welfarestate tend to emphasize their linear or direct relationship. However, these studiesignore the fact that policy development in the process of democratic transitionis conditioned by the institutional context and structure. In particular, inEast Asia, the process of development is deeply shaped by the developmentalstate. Therefore, social policy is considered subordinate to economic policy, asthe latter limits the state’s capacity for institutional choice of social protection.This paper aims to reinterpret how democracy has affected the institutionalchoice of National Pension Insurance in Taiwan through a political economicperspective. We found on the one hand, that the developmental strategies in theera of the authoritarian regime, reinforced the decentralisation of workingclasses; and on the other hand, social policy in the SMEs-dominated productionregime was accented to promote labour market flexibility and, in turn, theissue of non-wage labour cost was highlighted. After democratisation, theinteraction of social policy legacies and political institutions reinforced classdifferentiation, and the design of electoral institutions prompted politicians topropose an allowance scheme to vie for electoral support. This furthered thefragmentation of the Taiwanese pension system, and eventually, resulted in thefragmented National Pension Insurance. |