英文摘要 |
This paper builds a two-period signaling game to study whether or not the‘ordinary’ long-run seller has sufficient incentive to gain credibility for his secondsale by delivering the good in the first period. We assume that short-run(one-shot) buyer is uncertain about the seller’s type, and whether or not theseller will be in the market in the second period is also seller’s private information.This model can be viewed as a dual model of Kreps and Wilson. Contraryto the uniqueness of the results in Kreps and Wilson, we have multiple equilibriumpaths passing the intuitive criterion. Hence, in order to obtain a uniqueequilibrium path, we must apply the criterion D1 and need strategic stability.Therefore, we can tell the discrepancy under each type of equilibrium conceptsunder asymmetric information. We also apply Gambit software to get a numericalsimulation of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this model. In the uniquestrategically stable equilibrium, when the probability of an ‘ordinary’ short-runseller is sufficiently low, the outcome is that the ‘ordinary’ long-run seller hassufficient incentive to gain credibility for his second sale by delivering thegood in the first period. Hence, concern for reputation can encourage sellers toadopt honest delivery behavior, thereby benefiting the market for online transactions. |