| 英文摘要 |
The main research question of this article is to analyze how parliament in a semi-presidential system oversees the executive branch and how the exercise of parliamentary powers influences the maintenance of constitutional order. The focus is on how the president and parliament interact under a semi-presidential system and how the exercise of parliamentary powers, such as parliamentary investigation powers and contempt of parliament, impacts the interaction and competition between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The article uses the example of the Legislative Yuan’s Powers and Functions Law, focusing specifically on provisions related to the presidential national address in Parliament, parliamentary investigation powers, and contempt of Parliament. The conclusion of this article is that the Legislative Yuan has the authority to enact new powers and functions laws or amend existing laws. However, if the result of such amendments infringes on the powers of other constitutional branches or imposes obligations on other branches that are not specified in the constitution, it cannot use parliamentary autonomy as a justification to avoid constitutional court review. The main duties of parliament are legislation, budget review, and supervision of the executive branch, rather than assuming quasi-judicial roles to exercise the powers of other branches. Parliamentary supremacy would undermine the separation of powers in a democratic political system, and only through constitutional interpretation declaring unconstitutional legislation by parliament can the balance of powers and the constitutional order be maintained. |