我國總統赴立法院國情報告制度爭議之探討

A Study on the Controversies Regarding the Presidential State of the Nation Report System to the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan

本文探討我國總統赴立法院國情報告制度過去的憲政認知、回顧2024年國會職權修法關於該制度的爭議，也對該制度的朝野論戰與憲法法庭的判決進行了評析。首先，本文認為，關於總統國情報告制度，憲法的模糊性賦予了政治行為者操作的空間，使其在不同的時空脈絡下以有利於己身的方式詮釋該制度。當政黨身為執政黨時，其會選擇袒護總統，而將之詮釋為有利於總統的形式，例如總統可拒絕立法院的邀請或不須與立委有所互動；當政黨身為在野黨時，則會將國情報告制度詮釋為有利於立法院的形式。其中，最大的癥結點在於總統與立委的互動安排，這也是實務上立法院邀請總統進行國情報告的提案最終皆無疾而終的主因。其次，本文認為，在我國憲政體制中，總統赴立法院進行國情報告乃是總統的憲法義務，並非總統的憲法權力，因此關於我國總統國情報告制度設計的討論，不宜過度援引將國情咨文定位為總統權力的美國與法國經驗。在我國半總統制下，立法院透過質詢與倒閣制度促使行政院對立法院負責；總統向立法院進行國情報告並接受立委詢答，則是立法院制衡總統權力的機制。在相關制度配套下，總統赴立法院進行國情報告的常態化，應能促成我國憲政體制的良性發展。然而，憲法法庭對總統國情報告制度的判決，貽誤了我國憲政體制強化立法院監督總統權力而難得開啟的機會之窗，殊為可惜。

This paper explores the historical constitutional perceptions of the presidential State of the Nation report to the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, reviews the controversies surrounding the 2024 parliamentary reform on this reporting system, and provides an analysis of the political debates and the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this issue. This paper argues that the constitutional ambiguity surrounding the presidential State of the Nation report system grants political actors much room for maneuver, enabling them to interpret the system in a manner that serves their interests depending on the political context. When a political party is in power, it tends to shield the president by interpreting the reporting system in a way that favors the president, such as justifying the refusal to attend the Legislative Yuan’s invitation or avoiding interactions with legislators. Conversely, when a political party is in opposition, it interprets the system in a way that strengthens the authority of the Legislative Yuan. The core issue lies in the arrangement of interactions between the president and legislators, which has been the primary reason why legislative proposals inviting the president to deliver a State of the Nation report have ultimately failed. This paper also contends that, within Taiwan’s constitutional system, the president’s State of the Nation report to the Legislative Yuan is a constitutional duty rather than a constitutional power. Therefore, discussions on the institutional design of Taiwan’s presidential reporting system should not overly rely on the experiences of the United States and France, where the State of the Union address is considered a presidential prerogative. Under Taiwan’s semi-presidential system, the Legislative Yuan holds the Executive Yuan accountable through interpellations and no-confidence votes; likewise, requiring the president to deliver a State of the Nation report and engage in questioning by legislators serves as a mechanism for the Legislative Yuan to check presidential power. With appropriate institutional arrangements, the normalization of the president’s State of the Nation report to the Legislative Yuan could contribute to the positive development of Taiwan’s constitutional system. However, the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this matter has regrettably missed a rare opportunity to strengthen the Legislative Yuan’s oversight of presidential power within Taiwan’s constitutional framework.