臺灣2024年選後半總統制下的分立政府與僵局

The Divided Government and Deadlock under Taiwan’s Semi-Presidential System after 2024 Election

我國於2024年1月，舉行了第16屆總統、副總統，以及第11屆立法委員的選舉。選舉結果，民進黨提名的「賴蕭配」，以相對多數贏得正副總統的選舉，也是首次單一政黨連續三屆贏得執政地位。但在立法院的部分，民進黨儘管在政黨票和區域選舉的總得票數都是相對多數，轉換為席次後卻以一席之差落居第二大黨，並且呈現三黨不過半的結構。選後賴清德總統任命卓榮泰擔任行政院院長並組閣，而國民黨則與民眾黨合作在國會取得過半優勢，接連在重大的法案、人事案、預算案上杯葛執政黨，使得憲政運作出現第二次的分立政府。在朝小野大的權力結構下，分立政府的憲政運作出現許多僵局與挑戰。本文認為，此次選舉結果及選後的運作，再次突顯出當前制度設計存在的盲點，也就是實務上難以透過解散國會或是倒閣來解決分立政府下的憲政僵局。而目前國民黨與民眾黨在立法院的合作，在「法案」、「人事」、「預算」三管其下進行強力的杯葛，讓當前的半總統制幾乎陷入難以運作的困境。這些困境也使得選後半年出現兩個特殊的現象：第一、在體制內行政院大量動用覆議甚至釋憲企圖解決困境，但幾乎沒有效果；第二、在公民社會出現選後的持續動員，以集會陳抗甚至罷免的方式，表達對在野黨強力杯葛的不滿。然而，以後續發展來看，這兩個途徑沒有辦法根本性的解決政治僵局，反而加深了朝野之間以及社會內部的對立。

Taiwan held the 16th presidential and 11th legislative elections in January 2024. The election result saw Lai Ching-Te winning the presidency with a plurality. However, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost its majority in the Legislative Yuan. After the election, President Lai Ching-Te appointed Cho Jung-Tai as the Premier and formed the cabinet. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT) cooperated with the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) to secure a majority in the legislature. They repeatedly blocked the ruling party on major bills, personnel matters, and budget proposals, leading to the second instance of a divided government in Taiwan's constitutional operation. This article argues that the election results and the subsequent operation once again highlight the blind spots in the current system design, specifically that it is practically difficult to resolve constitutional deadlocks under a divided government through the dissolution of the legislature or a vote of no confidence. Currently, the cooperation between the KMT and the TPP in the Legislative Yuan has involved strong obstruction under the three main areas of ''bill,'' ''personnel,'' and ''budget,'' putting the current semi-presidential system in a near-unworkable predicament. These challenges have led to two distinctive phenomena occurring a few months after the election: First, the Executive Yuan has heavily relied on motions for veto and even constitutional interpretation in an attempt to resolve the impasse, but with little effect. Second, outside the system, civil society has continued mobilizing post-election, using rallies, protests, and even recall efforts to express dissatisfaction with the opposition's strong obstruction. However, looking at subsequent developments, neither of these approaches has been able to resolve the political deadlock; rather, they have deepened the divide between the ruling and opposition parties and increased internal societal conflicts.