董事民事賠償責任訴追機制──以雙重代表訴訟為核心

Directors’Civil Liability Litigation Mechanism: Focusing on the Double Derivative Suit

關係企業經營模式於現代經濟社會已成為常態。若從屬公司因其董事之行為受有損害，持有從屬公司股份之控制公司自亦間接受有損害。然若作為從屬公司股東之控制公司不積極追究從屬公司董事責任，該未能獲得彌補之控制公司損害，即將由控制公司之股東最終承受。目前我國公司法關係企業專章之規範，著重在從屬公司少數股東之保護，較忽略控制公司少數股東之保護問題。相較之下，英美、日本以及中國大陸等國在傳統股東代表訴訟之基礎下，衍生發展出所謂的「雙重代表訴訟」，賦予未持有從屬公司股份之控制公司股東在一定條件下得代控制公司對其從屬公司之董事提起代表訴訟，以保障控制公司與其從屬公司之利益。我國公司法關係企業專章在考量保護從屬公司少數股東之同時，亦應反思控制公司之股東是否亦有保護之必要，以避免有心人士利用制度設計逃脫其責任。因此，本文將檢討我國現行法下對董事之求償機制，其後針對美國法、英國法、日本法、中國大陸相關法制進行比較分析，並透過對各國有關雙重代表訴訟制度之探討，進而提出建構我國雙重代表訴訟制度之建議。

The business model of affiliated enterprises has become normal in the modern economy. If a subsidiary company suffers damage due to the behaviors of its director, the controlling company holding shares in the subsidiary company will also suffer indirect damage. However, if the controlling company, as a shareholder of the subsidiary company, does not actively institute an action against the subsidiary company’s director, the controlling company’s shareholders will ultimately bear the unrecovered damages. At present, the statutory regime of affiliated enterprises under Taiwan’s Company Act focuses on protecting minority shareholders of subsidiary companies, while neglecting the protection of minority shareholders of controlling companies. In contrast, countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and the mainland China have developed so-called“double derivative suit,”building upon traditional derivative actions. The double derivative suit allows minority shareholders of the controlling company who do not hold shares in a subsidiary company to, under certain conditions, bring a derivative action on behalf of the controlling company against the directors of its subsidiary company, thereby safeguarding the interests of both the controlling company and its subsidiaries. While the regulations of affiliated enterprises in Taiwan’s Company Act considers protecting minority shareholders of subsidiary companies, it should also reflect on the need for protection for minority shareholders of the controlling company to prevent those who exploit the system to evade liability. Therefore, this article will review the current directors’civil liability litigation mechanism in Taiwan, followed by a comparative analysis of the relevant legal systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the mainland China. Then, it will offer suggestions to establishing a system of the double derivative suit in Taiwan.