| 英文摘要 |
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) considerations have become a prevailing paradigm within contemporary investment practice. By employing ESG metrics in the selection of investment targets, investors are not only able to pursue their financial objectives but may also generate ancillary benefits for third parties. Nevertheless, because ESG Investing may implicate considerations beyond the interests of beneficiaries—such as broader social or ethical concerns—it raises potential tensions with the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which traditionally requires trustees to manage trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The question, therefore, arises as to whether, and to what extent, trustees may legitimately incorporate ESG factors into their investment decisions within the framework of trust law. In Taiwan, the normative debate appears to have been muted in practice. Over the past several years, ESG has been vigorously promoted across multiple constituencies, ranging from government agencies to corporations, investors, and consumers. Within this context, the legitimacy of ESG investing by trustees is almost unchallenged. Yet it is still unclear whether Taiwan’s existing legal framework allow investment strategies which are explicitly premised upon ESG considerations. This article employs a comparative law methodology. It begins by examining the controversies and debates that have arisen under U.S. law regarding the permissibility of ESG investing by trustees, then turns to an analysis of the interpretive and practical implications under Taiwanese law. The article concludes by offering tentative reflections on possible directions for future legal reform. |