證券團體訴訟對公司治理影響之實證研究──兼論投資人及期貨交易人保護中心之改革方向

An Empirical Study on the Impact of Securities Class Actions on Corporate Governance: Reforming the Role of the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center

本文之目的，乃藉由對我國證券團體訴訟進行實證研究，探討公司治理之優劣，是否導致證券團體訴訟之發生，以及證券團體訴訟發生後，對於公司治理是否產生影響，以作為檢視投保中心獨占性與成效之實證基礎。在研究架構上，本文首先分析相關理論與文獻，建立OLS模型與羅吉斯迴歸模型，且同時利用傾向性評分匹配方法（PSM）與差異中的差異法（Difference-in-Difference, DID）等方法進行分析。結果發現，團體訴訟的提起對於公司治理而言，並不具完全的嚇阻、激勵或促進公司治理效果，而僅對於家族企業較為顯著。此亦呼應我國文獻認為投保中心無法有效發揮嚇阻不法效果之觀察。未來法制上可考慮採納私人吹哨制度，甚至採取美國法中私人檢察官之機制，使其能輔助目前高度依賴刑事訴訟程序的投保中心制度，以發揮更高的嚇阻不法與促進公司治理效果。

This study conducts an empirical investigation of securities class actions in Taiwan to examine whether variations in corporate governance contribute to the occurrence of such lawsuits and whether these lawsuits, once initiated, exert any influence on subsequent governance practices. The analysis further provides an evidentiary basis for assessing the exclusivity and effectiveness of the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC). The research framework first reviews relevant theories and literature, followed by the construction of both OLS and logistic regression models. Additionally, propensity score matching (PSM) and the difference-in-differences (DID) method are employed to strengthen causal inference. The findings indicate that the initiation of class actions does not produce a consistent deterrent, incentive, or governance-enhancing effect; rather, significant impacts are observable primarily within family-controlled firms. This outcome aligns with existing Taiwanese scholarship suggesting that the SFIPC has limited deterrent capacity against corporate misconduct. From a regulatory perspective, future reforms might consider adopting mechanisms such as private whistleblowing systems or even the U.S.-style private attorney general model to complement the SFIPC’s current reliance on criminal proceedings, thereby enhancing both deterrence and the promotion of sound corporate governance.