| 英文摘要 |
In China, there is a stark contrast between the legislative emphasis placed on homeowners' self-governance and its serious dysfunction in practice, producing a situation of multiple losses. As China's real estate sector gradually enters an aging cycle, improving neighborhood governance will become ever more difficult and urgent. The fundamental reason for the failure of China's legislation on homeowners' self-governance lies in its structural misalignment and deficiencies. First, the distinctive features of Chinese residential communities—typically closed, of super-large scale, and high density—generate governance burdens that far exceed the carrying capacity of homeowners' self-governance. Substantively, this is the product of local governments, under China's land system, privatizing municipal public goods in order to maximize cost-benefit outcomes, a classic case of public law retreating into private law. Second, homeowners' self-governance as a form of private governance faces inherent difficulties even under ordinary circumstances; even if legislation pre-sets targeted coping measures, these challenges are hard to overcome. Yet China's legislation, by taking the opposite course with counterintuitive provisions, has further magnified the difficulty of implementation. The combination of these dual structural predicaments means that resolving the dysfunction of China's legislation on homeowners' self-governance cannot be achieved merely through adjustments based on private law logic or policy-level finetuning. It is instead necessary to properly distinguish between autonomy under private law and government responsibility under public law, and to provide robust legislative responses tailored to the inherent dilemmas of homeowners' self-governance. |