英文摘要 |
The compliance reform of enterprises involved in legal cases, although based on legal foundations and theoretical underpinnings and having achieved commendable political, legal, social, and economic outcomes, has never ceased to face skepticism. A significant reason for this is the expansion of prosecutorial discretion that the reform relies on, along with some controversial practices in its exercise. Despite the prosecutorial authorities setting up a hierarchy of approval mechanisms that include reporting to provincial-level prosecutorial offices, third-party supervision and evaluation mechanisms, and compliance acceptance hearing procedures in the reform plan, these are not sufficient to effectively prevent the abuse of prosecutorial discretion in enterprise compliance, nor to dispel doubts about its equality and fairness. To ensure the continued deepening of this reform and to ensure that the positive results already achieved are accepted by the fourth amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law, it is not only necessary for prosecutors to follow the principle of objectivity and fairness and to take the public interest measurement principle and the proportionality principle as the basis for the exercise of discretion in handling corporate compliance cases. It is also essential to start from key aspects of handling corporate compliance cases such as the selection of case handling models, the initiation of rectification procedures, compliance supervision and inspection, and incentives for corporate compliance. Through legislative regulation, prosecutorial internal regulation, judicial review by courts, and regulation by social forces, effective regulation of prosecutorial discretion in corporate compliance can be achieved. |