法律解釋何以可能？——法律解釋的推論主義說明

What Makes Legal Interpretation Possible? An Inferentialist Account of Legal Interpretation

推論語義學的基本觀點是，概念實踐是一種給出和索取理由的語言遊戲，特定表達的意義在相關推論中得以闡明，掌握一個表達並使之清晰，就是掌握該表達在相關語言遊戲中的推論角色。根據這一理論，法律表達的意義也由其在法律實踐中的推論角色所決定。作為一種探究法律表達之意義的活動，法律解釋既不是對法律文本之先在意義或立法者原意的還原，也不是完全依賴於具體情境的創造，而是一種尋求法律話語之最佳解釋的推論過程。最佳解釋的正確性取決於解釋實踐中的推論規則，而這些規則來源於解釋實踐背後的“相互承認模型”。由此可見，法律解釋是一種受規則指引的推論實踐，法律規範之意義的客觀性決定於這一實踐的規範結構。

The basic ideas of inferential semantics are that conceptual practice 1s a language game of giving and asking for reasons, that the meaning of a particular expression is elucidated in an inference, and that to master an expression so as to make it explicit is to master the inferential role of that expression in the relevant language game. According to this theory, the meaning of legal expressions is decided by the inferential role it plays in legal practice. As an activity of inquiry into the meaning of legal expressions, legal interpretation is neither a tracing back process of the preexisting meaning for legal text or original intention of the legislators, nor a creative activity according to specific context. It is an inferential process seeking the best interpretation of the legal discourse, and the correctness of the best interpretive depends on the inferential rules of the interpretive practice, which derive from ''the model of reciprocal recognition'' behind the practice of legal interpretation. Therefore, legal interpretation is a practice regulated by rules, and the objectivity of the meaning of legal norms is determined by the normative structure of this practice.