論楊澤波以「倫理心境」詮釋「孟子學」的合理性

Analysis on Yang Ze-Bo's Interpretation of “Mencius' Moral Philosophy” as “Doctrine of Ethical Mentality”

中國學者楊澤波是研究孟子學的教授，他鑽研孟子學多年，為其做一註解「倫理心境」，認為孟子學不離此說。「倫理心境」是指人透過後天社會經驗和「智性思維」而得來的結晶，結晶作為道德行動的依據，迫使人按其行動。不過，關於「道德源於經驗」的詮釋進路，即承認孟子學中的「性善」是從後天學習而來，此說無異於承認孟子所謂的「性善」是指「性向善」。然而，筆者認為，關於「性向善」的詮釋進路，對於「人為何會選擇善行作為行為根據」似乎必須超出孟子學本身的內容以外，另外提出說法解釋，而會有詮釋合理性的問題，至於楊氏所謂「倫理心境」亦是如此。因此，本文對「倫理心境」提出四點質疑，希望藉由論證「倫理心境」的合理性時，同時握到「性善」的基本意涵。

Professor Yang Ze-Bo annotated Mencius' moral philosophy as ''Luenlishinjing (倫理心境， ethical mentality)''. ''Luenlishinjing'' refers to the crystallization of people through social experience and ''intellectual thinking''. The crystallization is the basis of moral action, forcing people to act according to ''Luenlishinjing''. However, the interpretation of ''Morality comes from experience'' admits that the ''Xing Shan (fundamental goodness of human nature)'' in Mencius comes from learning. This also admits that ''Xing Shan'' in Mencius means ''human nature as tending to goodness''. However, I believe that this kind of proposition seems to have to provide an additional explanation for ''why people choose goodness as the basis of behavior'', and there will be a problem of his interpretation. ''Luenlishinjing'' has the same problem, as well. Therefore, this article raises four questions to the theory of ''Luenlishinjing''. I will reveal my understanding and interpretation of ''Xing Shan (fundamental goodness of human nature)'' by clarifying whether professor Yang's annotation of Mencius' moral philosophy as ''Luenlishinjing'' is reasonable or not.