民粹領袖、憲政體制和民主運作：以美國、義大利、厄瓜多和祕魯為例

Populist Leaders, Democratic Breakdown, and Democratic Equilibrium: Comparing Ecuador, Italy, Peru and the U.S.

本文的研究問題是哪些結構性的因素容易導致民粹領袖或民粹主義政黨的崛起？民粹領袖的個人組織和民粹主義政黨運作政治權力的差異？本文以四個國家如美國、義大利、厄瓜多和秘魯，其民粹領袖掌握政治權力的運作經驗來論證民粹領袖的政治組織和國會支持如何促成民主崩潰和民主均衡。本文發現當民粹主義的領袖是以政黨組織來動員以及國會獲得多數支持時，其可以透過行政和立法的合一來建構和鞏固民粹體制。當民粹領袖是以個人化的民粹組織進行動員時以及擁有國會多數支持時，可以建立個人化的政治支持，但因為缺乏政黨幹部或議員代表的中間連結，導致民粹組織鬆散，很容易因為民粹主義領袖失勢之後，民粹組織可能會一同崩潰或瓦解。

What structural factors contribute to the emergence of populist leaders or parties? What are the nuances distinguishing personal populist organizations from populist parties? This paper examines the cases of four countries—the U.S., Italy, Ecuador, and Peru—to elucidate how the political structures of populist movements, along with their legislative backing, influence democratic breakdown or democratic equilibrium or breakdown. The findings suggest that populist leaders can solidify their regimes by leveraging party infrastructure and securing majority support in parliamentary or congressional bodies. However, when populist leaders rely solely on personal organizations supported by legislative majorities, it tends to lead to the destabilization of populist regimes due to a lack of intermediary connections