董監事責任險與董事辭任

Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance and Directors’Resignation

本研究根據臺灣上市上櫃非金融產業共1,532家公司的於2008年至2018年的資料，檢驗董監事責任險(directors’and officers’liability insurance)保障對董事辭任的影響。理論上雖然董監事責任險保障有助於減少董事面對訴訟產生的預期損失而降低其辭任誘因，但較高程度的董事監事責任險保障亦隱含公司的高風險特性而提高董事辭任誘因。透過敘述統計、相關分析與多重迴歸估計，本研究發現董監事責任險保障程度與董事辭任成顯著正向關係，其中獨立董事辭任受董監事責任險之正向影響的顯著證據最為普遍。

This research examines the relationship between directors’and officers’liability insurance (DOLI) coverage and directors’motivations to resign, based on data from 1,532 non-financial listed firms in Taiwan between 2008 and 2018. DOLI is known to reduce a firm’s overall risks by lowering expected loss due to litigations. Such risk reduction in theory decreases the motivations for directors to resign. However, higher DOLI coverage may imply greater overall risk and instead increase the motivations for resignation. By using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multiple regression estimations, the evidence shows a significantly positive relationship between DOLI coverage and reduction of directors’resignation. Such correlation is most commonly observed for independent directors.