經費分配規則對二維度競租活動的影響

The Influence of Sharing Rule on Two-Dimensional Rent-Seeking Activities

本文以Katz et al. (1990)的純地方公共財經費競租分析架構為基礎，結合Faria et al. (2014)二維度競租投入模型的設定方式，建立一個二維度區域間經費競租分析模型。利用我們所建立的理論模型，探討上級政府的經費分配規則對於二維度競租活動的影響效果，發現均衡整體競租努力投入水準，在兩個區域的居民人數不同的情況下，將有可能會隨著中央政府增加其經費依據區域之人數比例來分配的比重而增加。本文的上述分析結果，與經費依據一定標準（包括區域人口比例）來分配的比重越高，將會降低競租社會浪費的經濟直觀有所差別。此外，不同於Katz et al. (1990)的公共財競租分析關於競租活動不受地區居民人數以及地區人數分配狀況影響的結論，在本文的二維度區域間經費競租分析架構下，兩個區域的人口差異程度，將會是影響二維度競租活動的重要因素。

Referring to the rent-seeking model for public goods proposed by Katz et al. (1990) and the two-dimensional rent-seeking model in Faria et al. (2014), we construct a new model that is two-dimensional, regional-based rent-seeking for funds. Using this model, we investigate the impact of the sharing rule of funds on two-dimensional, rent-seeking activities. Different from intuition that believes increasing those funds allocated according to a specific standard will decrease social rent-seeking effort, our finding shows that when the number of residents in two regions is different, the central government raises the proportion of its funds allocated according to the number of residents in those two regions, which may increase overall social, rent-seeking effort. In addition, different from traditional studies on public goods’rent-seeking that note the population and population distribution do not affect rent-seeking waste, our finding illustrates that regional population differences do affect two-dimensional, rent-seeking activities.