英文摘要 |
This article examines the causal pathways through which the parallel voting system and semi-presidential system affects constitutional operations. Following the third wave of democratization, the parallel voting system has garnered increased attention due to the rising number of countries adopting it. However, in studies addressing the effects of the parallel voting system, variations in institutional structures are often overlooked or scarcely discussed. This paper introduces three explanatory variables: the type of semi-presidential system (either presidential-parliamentary or premier-presidential), the electoral schedule, and the primary method for selecting members of the president's party (or alliance). These variables are used to assess the substantive influence of the president on the party. Through a comparative analysis of Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia, this study suggests that when the president's substantive influence over the party is stronger (whether strongest or second strongest), it tends to favor a president-centric constitutional operation. Conversely, when the president's influence is weaker (either weakest or second weakest), it may challenge the establishment of such an operation. However, this does not necessarily lead to a prime minister and parliament-centric constitutional operation. To conclude, the influence of the constitutional and electoral systems on constitutional operations must account for differences in institutional structures and the mutual influence between the president and parliament during electoral schedule. |