重新思索人道干預在國際法上之定位

Rethinking the Positioning of Humanitarian Intervention under International Law

人道干預（humanitarian intervention）最早從哲學與神學對於「義戰」（just war）的討論中衍生而來。這種觀念認為，在一定條件下，為防止一國暴虐、不正當的統治，其他國家應有道德上的正當性，對之發動戰爭，以終結不義的狀態。然在當代國際法脈絡下，學說針對其合法性的問題，始終爭論不休。本文主張：《聯合國憲章》雖未正面禁止人道干預，卻也沒有為人道干預提供明確的法律基礎。針對這個爭議，本文主張在：（1）多國聯合使用武力；（2）在人權侵害「進行中」所發動的、非「先發性」（anticipatory）干預，以及（3）基於防止「滅絕種族、危害人類、種族清洗與戰爭罪」的理由所發動之干預，應已受習慣國際法承認。

Humanitarian intervention originated from the philosophical and theological discussion on‘just war’. According to this view, the recourse to force by other states against it is morally permissible to prevent abusive and unjust governance of a state. In modern international law, however, there has been a sharp disagreement over such interventions’legality. This paper contends that the UN Charter does not offer a clear legal basis for such acts, despite not having illegalised them. On the other hand, humanitarian intervention has become part of customary international law under the conditions where (1) the intervening party comprises multiple states; (2) the intervention aims to halt an‘ongoing’human rights violation and is non-anticipatory; and (3) the intervention launched is to prevent‘genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes’.