內幕交易犯罪識別路徑研究：從發行人許可的“內幕交易”談起

Research on Insider Trading Crime Identification Path: From Issuer Licensed 'Insider Trading'

近年來，部分美國學者主張允許發行人許可的內幕交易，在我國執法環境中，上述行為大概率將被認定為具有行政違法性，但是否當然地引發對當事人刑事責任的追究則有待商榷。本文對我國內幕交易犯罪的法益識別理論進行了反思，主張根據以信義義務為基礎的反欺詐理論對內幕交易中值得刑法保護的法益加以甄別。司法機關應當對內幕交易案件進行獨立判斷，在發行人許可並對特定內幕信息知情人參與交易的行為及時予以披露的情形當中，即便在超額收益與行為人所具備信息優勢地位間存在可被證明的因果關係，因不存在對發行人和股東的欺詐，仍應考慮非犯罪化處理的可能。借此希望為司法實踐提供一種有效、穩定且克制的裁判路徑，緩解當前由行政機關把握內幕交易“入罪”節奏的實踐難題。

Since recent years, some American scholars have claimed that issuer-licensed insider trading should be allowed. If cases of this kind occur in China, then they are highly likely to be regarded as administratively illegal considering China's current legal regime and enforcement status quo. However, it remains questionable whether such hypothetical insider trading cases would raise criminal liabilities. Therefore, this article revisits the current interest－identifying criminal theories in China, and argues that anti-fraud theory that derives from fiduciary duty should be introduced to identify the essential interest that should be protected by criminal law for insider trading. Moreover, this article argues China's judiciary should independently ascertain if the insider trading cases before it should criminalized, and further specify certain types of insider trading behaviors (including issuer-licensed insider trading) that should be decriminalized.