CEO內部負債和企業社會責任之關聯性

CEO Inside Debt Holdings and Corporate Social Responsibility

本文探討CEO內部負債與企業社會責任的關聯性，本文運用2007-2014年間美國公開發行公司樣本，實證發現，CEO持有較高的內部負債越傾向投入企業社會責任活動。本文發現內部負債促使CEO選擇正面社會責任活動（例如：提供員工優渥的福利計畫），而非抑制其不道德行為（例如：減少雇用童工）；CEO內部負債與企業社會責任的正向關聯性在主要利害關係人的活動上較次要利害關係人的活動上顯著；CEO內部負債會驅使企業長期持續的投入企業社會責任活動。最後，本研究發現當企業違約風險越高時，CEO內部負債持有者越會投入企業社會責任活動。整體而言，本文實證支持企業社會責任活動是內部負債持有者減緩債務代理成本的重要管道之一。

This paper examines the relationship between chief executive officers (CEOs) inside debt holdings and corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using a sample of U.S. public firms for the period 2007-2014, we find that CEOs with higher levels of inside debt engage in more CSR, and such engagement is due mainly to the increase of socially responsible activities rather than to the decrease in socially irresponsible activities. We also observe that greater positive effects of CEOs inside debt holdings are stronger for CSR targeting primary stakeholders than targeting secondary stakeholders. We find that inside debt provides long-term incentives for CEOs to undertake CSR for continuously curbing the agency costs of debt. Finally, we note that the effect of inside debt on CSR is more pronounced when default risk is high. Our results show that CSR engagement are essential channels for inside debt holders to reduce agency costs of debt.