CEO薪酬比率揭露規定對CEO薪酬的影響

The Effect of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule on CEO Compensation

美國證券管理委員會在2015年要求公司揭露該公司CEO薪酬相對於公司中位數員工薪酬的比率（CEO薪酬比率）。本文使用CEO薪酬資訊細節足夠的487家公司，實證結果發現在CEO薪酬比率揭露規定公布前有比較高CEO薪酬比率的公司，在揭露規定公布後減少該公司CEO總薪酬的金額。CEO總薪酬金額的減少主要是由於員工認股權金額的減少。另外，本文發現在CEO薪酬比率揭露規定公布前有比較高CEO薪酬比率的公司，在揭露規定公布後縮短CEO激勵報酬的既得期間、設定比較容易達成的績效既得報酬的績效標準、並增加使用會計績效條件在激勵報酬的使用，而這些CEO薪酬條件的改變並未出現在CEO薪酬比率比較低的公司。這些發現顯示高CEO薪酬比率的公司減少CEO薪酬對CEO的風險以補償總薪酬金額的減少。

The SEC required companies to disclose a pay ratio, which compares the compensation of a company’s chief executive officer (CEO) to the compensation of the company’s median employee in 2015. Using a sample of 487 firms, I find that firms with a higher CEO pay ratio before the rule adoption decrease the CEO’s total compensation in the post adoption period. The decrease in the CEO’s total compensation is attributable to the reduction in option awards. Moreover, I find that high pay ratio firms shorten the vesting schedule of the CEOs’incentive grants, set easier to achieve targets for CEOs’performance-vested awards, and increase the use of accounting-based performance provisions in the CEO’s incentive compensation in the post adoption period. I do not observe similar changes to CEOs’compensation packages for low pay ratio firms. These findings are consistent with high pay ratio firms reducing the riskiness of the CEO pay to compensate for the reduced compensation after the rule adoption.