論曾天從對胡塞爾的「意向相關物」的批判

On Zeng Tian-zong's Critique of Husserl's ''Intentional Correlates''

曾天從（1910-2007）是日治時期台灣哲學的代表之一。「擬而真理自體」是其在哲學上的主要貢獻。藉由這個概念的提出，曾天從批判了所有觀念論的基本思惟型態。相對於胡塞爾的「現象學的還原」，他提出「真理論的還原」來作為其真理論中「純粹哲學」的主要依據。本論文主要處理其對胡塞爾的現象學，特別是對胡塞爾「意向的相關物」，也就是意向活動中所指向的「意義」（Sinn, sense）與「對象」（Gegenstand, object）的部分。由於這一部分的討論，在胡塞爾學界中已是一個經典的問題，筆者隨之也處理了A. Gurwitsch、Dagfinn Føllesdal與R. Bernet這三種不同的解釋，以突顯曾天從的哲學的創見。

Zeng Tian-zong (1910-2007) is one of the representatives of Taiwanese philosophy from the period of Japanese rule. Through his concept of ''Quasi-Truth-in-itself,'' which is one of Zeng's main contributions to philosophy, he criticizes the basic form of idealism. In response to Husserl's ''phenomenological reduction,'' he proposes the idea of ''alethiological reduction'' as the main basis for ''pure philosophy'' in his study of alethiology. This paper examines Zeng's critique of Husserl's phenomenology, especially of Husserl's ''intentional correlates,'' which are pertinent to the ''sense'' (Sinn) and ''object'' (Gegenstand) in intentional acts. As the discussion of ''intentional correlates'' has been a classic and long-running dispute among the ''Husserl scholars,'' this paper further appends the complications of phenomenology to A. Gurwitsch's, Dagfinn Føllesdal's and R. Bernet's respective interpretations in order to highlight Zeng Tian-zong's robust contribution to philosophy.