美、日公司法上的董事合規、內控義務及其對我國的啟示

我國公司法對合規進行回應需先解決兩個基本問題，其一是董事會職能的重新定位，包括確立董事會的監督職能，明確董事承擔業務監督義務；其二是明確董事不作為責任的追責路徑，並在適當時機引入體系規則和董事的體系義務。從美、日經驗來看，確立董事會經營監督職責，乃至董事合規及相關體系義務必先構築董事會與業務執行之間的資訊獲取管道。而董事不作為責任追責中的核心，則是在明確商業判斷規則適用的基礎之上，對包括“體系內容”及“紅旗信號”（red flags）等進行合理審查。對於我國而言，可將商業判斷規則作為法院對董事義務履行進行實質審查的方法，並基於“相當的因果關係”區別認定非業務執行董事和業務執行董事的責任，並在對我國公司治理進行改善的基礎上引入體系規則和董事的體系義務。只有通過以上重構，才能在董事的“合規、內控”等公司管理責任承擔中更好地尋求實質正義和社會效率。

The Chinese Company Law must address two fundamental issues to strengthen corporate compliance. The first issue concerns function adjustment of the board. The Law should strengthen the board’s supervisory role and explicitly impose business monitoring duty upon board directors. Second, the Law should provide the accountability path for examining directors' omission liability and.at the appropriate time, introduce corporate compliance rules and the duty of directors to establish an internal compliance system ('duty of system establishment'). From experiences of the United States and Japan, it is necessary to build the board's access to information of business execution before establishing the board's business supervision duty and directors' duty of system establishment. To address directors' dereliction of duty, it is essential to review such matters as 'System Content' or 'Red Flags' reasonably based on a clearly-enforced business judgment rule (BJR). The author suggests that China shall (1) adopt the BJR as a method of substantive examination to review directors' performance of duties in substance.(2) distinguish executive directors' from non-executive directors' duties based on adequate causal connections, and (3) introduce corporate compliance rules and directors' duty of system establishment based on the improvement of corporate governance in China. The aforesaid reforms are indispensable for seeking substantive justice and social efficiency from directors' compliance and internal control duties.