英文摘要 |
The relationship between the Constitution and politics is an important issue for the modernization of French state governance. Since the establishment, of the French Fifth Republic under Charles de Gaulle, the President of the Republic has been at the heart, of the French state apparatus. Article 5 of the French Constitution positions the president as a supervisor, arbiter, and defender of the powers he enjoys in a multi-layered structure: a passive operator under normal politics, a mediator of disputes in state institutions, and a subject of power in a state of emergency. However, political facts affect and even subvert the literal meaning of constitutional norms, resulting in a disorderly exercise of power. The presidential power has been transformed from the supervision of the implementation of the French Constitution to the implicit constitutional power» and from the power to arbitrate institutional disputes to the power to make executive decisions. In this regard, both political and academic circles have attempted to reform the presidential power to create a symmetrical power and responsibility. However, there is a divergence of views on how to achieve this goal, especially on whether to confirm the identity of the arbiter president, how to clarify the powers and responsibilities of the president and the prime minister, and whether to strengthen parliamentary checks and balances on the president, and establish a system of presidential responsibilities. In this process, there is a tension between the inherent change of constitutional norms and the normative force of political facts. Political facts are not a “necessary evil” and the study of the process of interaction between norms and facts also sheds light on the methodology of our constitutional studies.
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