| 中文摘要 |
"在已取得第二意義和因此得以辨識和區別特定品牌（因而指示商品來源）之情形，本院無法從商標法基本目的得出任何明顯否認以單一顏色作為商標之理論。原則上，商標法藉由禁止他人抄襲識別商品來源的標誌，以減輕消費者購物和做出購買抉擇之成本，因為潛在消費者可迅速且輕易地藉由物件上的商標判斷此項商品是由其所喜歡或討厭的同一生產者製造的商品。在此同時，商標法協助確保生產者﹙而不是模仿的競爭者﹚獲得優質商品所帶來的商譽和金錢報酬。商標法因此鼓勵生產優質的商品，並且同時制止藉由利用消費者無法迅速對提供銷售的商品做出品質評價而販售劣質商品之人。識別商品來源的商標功能﹙不是其本身作為顏色、形狀、氣味、文字或記號之本體狀態﹚讓商標達成這些基本目的。並為此原因，難以自商標的基本目的得出絕對不允許以單一顏色作為商標之結論。We cannot find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand (and thus indicates its 'source'). In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 'reduces the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item -- the item with this mark -- is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked or disliked in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it and not an imitating competitor will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. The law thereby 'encourages the production of quality products,' and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale. It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark -- not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign -- that permits it to serve these basic purposes. And, for that reason, it is difficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark." |
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