論故意與過失的犯罪論體系性地位──古典立場的堅持與修正

從評價角度而言，在故意與過失的判斷問題上，將認識要素作為意志要素前提的通說觀點存在疑問。故意與過失的區分重心在於行為人針對“構築起違法性基礎的構成要件事實”的認識與認識可能性的差異，認識與認識可能性的判斷屬於責任階段所要考察的內容。通常所認為的故意所具有的“認識+意志”兩要素當中，只有“認識”要素才最終起到了區分故意與過失的機能，“意志”要素並非責任的內容，而是先於“認識”率先進入到了“構成要件行為”當中，並定義了行為的不法及其程度上的強弱。在諸如防衛過當、假想防衛、假想防衛過當等場合，沒有必要先承認構成要件故意之後再在責任階段變行為為過失，只要行為具有“意志”即屬於構成要件行為，不需要在構成要件階段就先區分出行為屬於故意行為還是過失行為，故意與過失的判斷完全可以放到責任階段。因此，發揮犯罪個別化機能的並非只有構成要件還應該包括責任，構成要件故意與構成要件過失的提法沒有必要。

In distinguishing between intent and negligence, the general view that “cognition” element is the precondition of “will” element is questionable. The distinction between intent and negligence depends on the difference between the actor's cognition and the possibility of it about the facts which constitute the basis of behavior's illegality. For a long time, we take “cognition” and “will” as necessary elements of the intent. But in fact, only “cognition” has the function of distinguishing between intent and negligence, and “will” is not belong to the actor's culpability. The “will” is prior to “cognition” and helps to define the meaning of “constitutive act” and its strength. In the condition of excessive defense, imaginary defense, imaginary excessive defense and other occasions, it is not necessary to admit “constitutive intent” or “constitutive negligence”，Intent and negligence always belong to the “culpability” of human, so long as his behavior has “will”, So, in the step of “constitutive act”, we do not have to make a distinction between intentional act or negligent act.