英文摘要 |
In the United States, when shareholders file a derivative action against directors, corporations will typically challenge with a motion to dismiss based on the decision of the special litigation committee. The court thus has to review and decide whether the lawsuit should be continued. There are four major judicial scrutiny standards developed with regard to the application of the business judgment rule: full application of the business judgment rule in Auerbach case, application of the independent business judgment of the court in Zapata case, denial of the independence of the special litigation committee appointed by the board of directors composed of the defendant directors in Miller case, as well as the replacement hereof with a thorough substantive judicial review in Al ford case. The pretrial judicial review procedure and the judicial review standards in shareholder derivative actions in the United States will have some implications to the perfection of the shareholder derivative action system in China. Judicial review procedure shall be introduced into the pretrial process, which requires the court to review, inter alia, the eligibility of the shareholder plaintiff, the demand requirement prior to the derivative suit, the harm to the corporation, and the reasons for the refusal of the management to pursue litigation. The court must strike a balance between two competing interests in deciding whether to proceed with the derivative suit: the interest of the shareholders and that of the corporation, law and the public interest. This will help reduce judicial costs and control the abuse of process in the balancing act between the directorial autonomy and accountability, and shareholders' right to maintain the interests of the corporation. |