監察院「當中」的國家人權委員會與國家防範機制

National Human Rights Institution and National Preventive Mechanism ‘within’ the Control Yuan

近年來，台灣的民主與人權有了長足的發展。除了批准數個聯合國條約並建立獨特的條約審查機制外，台灣還決定進一步採取措施，建立自己的人權機構，積極監督其人權上的承諾。究竟此一重責大任應交由哪個機構執行？在建立國家人權委員會的過程中，各方就這個問題有激烈的討論。最後，監察院「勝出」，成為安置國家人權委員會和國家酷刑預防機制的機構。有趣的是，對於監察院設置國家人權委員會和國家預防機制一事，公民社會和學者的反應冷淡，非如預期般讚揚這項空前的人權承諾。如此遲疑的原因，在於監察院組織定位不明，其陳舊的組織結構和功能亦可能難以滿足當今有效監督人權的要求。批評的聲音反映出人民的擔憂，究竟這項改革只是門面上的裝扮，還是確實有可能為台灣建立有效的監督機構？如果希望邁向後者，則監察院的現行架構是否能為國家人權委員會和國家預防機制提供足夠的空間，使他們完全獨立於外部力量和內部的糾葛？這些機構的結構、組成和工作策略的最佳選擇為何？這些新任務應該如何在監察院現任成員──或更確切地說在國家人權委員會委員──之間，加以區隔？

Recent years have witnessed remarkable progress in democracy and human rights in Taiwan. In addition to the ratification of several United Nations treaties and the establishment of a peculiar treaty review mechanism, Taiwan has decided to take a step further and set up its own human rights watchdogs that shall actively monitor the achieved human rights commitments. On a thorny path towards establishing a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a vivid discussion was held on what institution shall carry out these important tasks. At the end of the day, the Control Yuan (ombudsman institution of Taiwan) have emerged ''victorious'' and became the authority that accommodates both, the NHRC and the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), a torture monitoring body. Intriguingly, instead of applauding these unparalleled human rights commitments, the establishment of the NHRC and the NPM by the Control Yuan received rather a lukewarm welcome from civil society and scholars. The reason for such a hesitant response lies in the ambiguity of the institutional settings of the Control Yuan and concerns that its archaic organization and functioning are far from present-day demands for effective human rights monitoring. The critical voices echo concerns as to whether this reform is actually a “window-dressing” or it has indeed the potential to create truly effective oversight bodies for Taiwan. If the latter holds true, does the current structure of the Control Yuan provide the NHRC and NPM adequate room to become self-confident actors which are fully independent on both, external forces and internal institutional bonds? What, then, should be the best choice for the structure of these bodies, their composition and working strategy? And how should these new mandates be separated between the current members of the Control Yuan, or more precisely among the commissioners of the NHRC?