物權的關係本質

使用霍菲爾德（Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld）的術語能夠提出一套完整瞭解物權法律結構的概念體系。物權不是人與物的法律關係，而是人與人之間的法律關係；物上關係所生的廣義權利，包括claim（請求權）、privilege（自由）、power（權力）、immunity（豁免）四種類型，統稱為物上廣義權利。四種物上廣義權利都有各自對應的物上廣義義務。意定合同關係與意定物上關係的關鍵差異在於，後者會對世自動產生物權人和世界全部第三人的法定物上關係，其內容為排他；對世、排他是意定物上關係的必要特徵。德國概念體系將物權定性為人和物之關係，與民法的法律關係、債權物權化概念無法接軌。其一方面將物權客體定性為有體物，另一方面又將權利質權定性為物權，自相矛盾。建構於霍菲爾德理論之上的物權概念體系更清楚、一貫。

This article utilizes Hohfeldian terminologies to propose a new conceptual system of property law. This article contends that a property relation is not a jural relation between a person and a thing, but one between persons. Property ablements are the umbrella term for four types of Hohfeldian rights—claims, privileges, powers, and immunities--in a jural relationship. Each type of property ablement has a correlative property disablement. The key difference between a voluntary contractual relationship and a voluntary property relationship is that the latter automatically gives rise to statutory property relationships between a property right holder and everyone else in the world, and the nature of the relationship is exclusion. In-remness and exclusion are necessary elements in a voluntary property relationship. The German conceptual system defines a property right as a legal relationship between a person and a thing, which is inconsistent with other aspects of the system, such as the definition of a legal relationship as one between persons and the theory of reified contractual rights. In addition, the German conceptual system on the one hand limits objects of property rights to corporeal things but on the other hand recognizes pledge over right as a type of property right, which is contradictory. The conceptual system proposed by this article is more logically consistent and clearer.