權利的規範力：一個對利益論的批判

關於“權利到底在保護什麼？”這個問題，通常存在兩種答案：其一，權利保護了權利人的自由意志以及由此而來的選擇自由，這是所謂的選擇論或意志論；其二，權利保護了權利人的個人利益或者個體福祉，這就是權利的利益論。並且，理論家通常認為，利益論明顯優於選擇論。然而，由於權利在概念上的重要性在於，一項權利所擁有的規範力要明顯超過該權利之內容所擁有的道德分量，因此以保護個人利益為中心的利益論，將無法匹配權利的規範力要求。雖然利益論的支持者將“共同善”當做補強權利規範力的策略，但由於共同善這個概念的核心要素必然是個人的自由意志或自治，於是這個策略存在蛻化為選擇論的危險，而且它還難以匹配指向性義務的要求，因此這種經過補強的利益論仍然難以成立。

There are two answers to what should be protected by rights. One is the choice theory or the will theory, which means that rights are there to protect the personal free-will or autonomy. The other is the interest theory, which means that rights are to protect personal interest. It is generally recognized that the interest theory is better. However, the conceptual importance of rights is the distinctly normative force of rights. That is to say that the moral weight of a rights goes beyond the moral weight of the content of the rights, and also beyond the moral weight of personal interest of the rights. Although Joseph Raz takes ''common good'' to defend the interest theory, it is unsuccessful because of two reasons: one is that the heart of common good is still personal free-will or autonomy and the other is that it does not fit with the directional duty of rights.