解讀英國布萊爾政府的歐元決策：公共政策理論的檢驗與評析

Interpreting the Blair Government's Euro Policy-Making: An Examination of Public Policy Theories

自歐盟會員國簽訂馬斯垂克條約，決定建立經濟與貨幣聯盟，採行單一貨幣－歐元（the Euro）之後，「英國是否要加入歐元？」即成為英國歷任政府所面臨最重要的政策議題。本文即在探討布萊爾政府其歐元政策的形成與決策過程。該政府延續前任者的觀望政策，而以發明五項檢驗標準標榜其經濟決定論／去政治化的決策手法，意圖降低此一議題在製造工黨分裂、大選以及公投中的多重政治風險。在所檢驗的四種公共政策理論中，理性選擇權理論較之多元主義、馬克斯主義、核心官僚理論，表現出最佳的適用性。

Following the agreement to establish the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the single currency, the euro, with the completion of the Maastricht Treaty in January 2002, the question remains whether or not the UK should join. This decision has been momentous for policy-makers. This paper is an attempt to investigate into how policy-making on the UK's EMU/euro membership has operated in the Blair government. The Blair government inherited the wait-and-see policy from its predecessor, but varies in detail. The five economic tests are invented and placed at the center of euro policymaking in order to, on the one hand, depoliticize political risks in general elections. On the other hand, the referendum serves the needs of party management. This paper to applies four main public policy-making theories to the euro policy case: the broker-state pluralist model; instrumental Marxism; the core executive model, and the rational choice theory. It found that, while each model demonstrates respective applicabilities to some extent, the core executive model and rational choice theory seem to be more applicable in our examination. However, in terms of constructing a theoretical framework, the rational choice theory provides a more clear and well-defined model.