從歐盟移民政策決策過程談自由派政府間主義

The Decision-Making Process Behind Coordinated EU Migration Policies - Implications for Theories in Regional Integration

當今歐洲整合理論的主流－自由派政府間主義，一方面肯定歐洲整合的重要性，一方面堅持區域組織沒有自主性，對會員國的行為影響有限。根據政府間主義，要解釋歐洲整合，最重要的因素是會員國自身的利益，而包括國內以及國際兩個層次的二重賽局理論則是提供一個最好的分析模型。本文利用民主赤字嚴重的會員國間移民政策的協調說明，該理論模型與歐盟的實際運作並不相符。本研究顯示，歐盟架構中的組織制度及其中的行為者對政策結果的影響力，遠超出會員國國內行為者對政策結果之影響力。

This article compares the decision-making process in the area of coordinated migration policies within the EU and the decision-making pattern liberal intergovernmentalists have posited under the two-level games model. While the two-level games model requires a strong democratic control mechanism, the decision-making in the area of coordinated migration policies is characterized by the so-called 'democratic deficits.' The serious problem of the democratic deficits provides strong evidence for the missing link between the interests-formation in pluralist societies on the one hand, and intergovernmental negotiations on the other. Contrary to the model formulated by intergovernmentalists and confirming neo-functionalist conviction, decision-making in this area bears strong supranational idiosyncrasies. Intergovernmentalists have obviously underestimated the importance of elites and technocrats in shaping policy outcomes.