董事忠實義務與利益衝突交易之規範──以公司法第206條為核心

Regulating Related Party Transactions: From the Perspective of the Director's Fiduciary Duties

關係人交易是我國財經犯罪中常見的弊案類型。案件層出不窮，與我國公司法與證券交易法有關利益衝突交易的規範過於簡略、欠缺可操作性有極大的關係。二○一八年十一月一日施行的新修正公司法對此議題有所關注，第206條第3項增定「董事之配偶、二親等內血親，或與董事有控制從屬關係之公司」為董事利害關係人之當然範圍，一改目前法院判決所採取之限縮解釋，將利益衝突之範圍延伸至間接利害關係的情況。此一修正對於強化我國利益衝突交易之規範與公司治理有極大的影響。本文從董事忠實義務之內涵出發，參酌美國、英國、香港與德國之規定，針對董事利益衝突之定義與範圍、董事利益衝突說明義務之方式與內容、董事利益衝突交易之決策機關與表決權迴避、控制公司與從屬公司間之交易、公平原則與安全港條款之採用，以及公司利益衝突交易管理機制之建立與董事監督義務等議題，提出法律適用與修法建議。

Related party transactions have long been a standard feature in corporate scandals in Taiwan due to the loose regulation. The situation may change as the Company Law was revised in 2018. The new Section 206(3) specifically provides that a director’s spouse, parent, child, sibling, grandparent, and grandchild of the director, as well as a company which is controlled by the director (or which controls the director), are all deemed to be the related person of such director. For the first time, the Taiwan company law makes it clear that the indirect conflicts of interest shall be regulated. The newly revised law could have a huge impact on both judicial decisions and corporate practices. Through a comparative study among the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Germany, this Article analyses and provides suggestions on the related party transactions regulations regarding the several key issues including the definition and scope of director’s conflicts of interest, the director’s duty of disclosure, the majority of minority (MOM) rule and disinterested directors’ approval, director’s duty to minority, and ex-post judicial fairness review. This Article concludes by providing policy suggestions for future revision of the law.