This research aims to reexamine the civil liability risk of auditors and propriety of relevant legislature, in comparative law and empirical approaches, with the recommendations to Taiwanese law. It is argued that the liability risk should be clarified before the revolution of liability regime and extra protection mechanisms. The liability risk of auditors, which may be influenced by policy consideration, is explored from the perspective of legislation and judicial behavior. For the former, the analysis begins at the discussion of Taiwanese law, and followed by the analysis concerning the scope of interested party. Through comparative law analysis, it is found that the liability of auditor has been narrowed down in recent years. And this study verifies this theory with Taiwanese data. For judicial behavior, the study empirically examines relevant cases in Taiwan. The results show that auditors are still dominant in litigations. In conclusion, it is found that the current limited liability risk of auditors in Taiwan, and reconsiderations are required for extra pro-auditor protections and legislature.