Traditional conviction-based forfeiture has been proved a failure when the offenders escape or die, the property belongs to a non-innocent third party, or the crime committed has run out statutes of limitation. All states in the United States and the federal government allow law enforcement to seize and forfeit cash, property, and other materials that they believe are associated with illegal activity. Civil forfeiture provides the government with a relatively easy way to deprive criminals of the fruits of the crimes. However, the increase in the number and scope of forfeiture laws created a concern regarding the procedural safeguards to ensure that property owners had adequate rights to defend property subject to forfeiture. Many states and the federal government allow the proceeds from forfeiture to go to law enforcement agencies. Moreover, in 1984, the federal government established its most controversial forfeiture policy－the equitable sharing program－whereby state and local agencies could request that the Department of Justice “adopt” and then share a drug-related asset seizure. The explicit motivation for the DOJ-sharing provision was to provide law enforcement at all levels with an incentive to pursue drug crimes. The incentive for abuse is tremendous, because local law enforcement agencies may use the forfeited properties to fund their operations. Forfeiture becomes necessary as a budgetary supplement. The current asset forfeiture system can result in allegations of “policing for profit.” In order to prevent the abuses of civil asset forfeiture, California reformed its asset forfeiture law to improve due process and property rights, and limit law enforcement’s ability to profit from seizing citizen’s property. This paper focuses on whether law enforcement forfeiture activities are influenced by a profit consideration. I will examine whether California’s local law enforcement agencies’ decision to participate in the federal government’s equitable sharing program are influenced by the share of proceeds the agency could have received under California law. I seek to further explore the effect of asset forfeiture laws on the behavior of both local governments and law enforcement.Meanwhile, the traditional criminal justice system in Taiwan includes only criminal and administrative forfeiture, while non-conviction based forfeiture is not yet in place. The absence of non-conviction based forfeiture leaves a huge gap in fighting and cubing economic crimes. In December, 2015, the Taiwanese legislature passed an amendment in the Criminal Code, allowing asset seizures and forfeitures without conviction under certain circumstances. The amendment further expends the range of forfeitable assets that belong to third parties. It is crucial to develop procedural mechanisms that can strike a balance between the object of forfeiture and the according crime. By developing a proper asset forfeiture process, Taiwan’s legal system will stand firm with three pillars: the administrative, criminal and non-conviction based forfeiture. The legal framework that facilitates the forfeiture of criminal assets will then become all-inclusive, and the enforcement agencies will be able to take advantage of such a system in a flexible approach when fighting the increasing number of economic crimes. More importantly, the study of U.S. federal and California asset forfeiture systems can provide invaluable insight and policy guidelines for Taiwanese government. The problems faced by the current U.S. asset forfeiture system indicate the importance of developing a proper safeguard to prevent any potential profit motives from law enforcement agencies. Several suggestions will be provided as a conclusion of this paper.