英文摘要 |
Using a sample of listed firms for the 2016-2018 period, we investigate whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) is associated with auditors' risk assessments, as proxied by the number of key audit matters disclosed in the audit reports. We find that firms with D&O insurance receive fewer key audit matters compared to firms without D&O insurance. For firms with D&O insurance, we find a negative association between normal (appropriate) D&O insurance coverage and the number of key audit matters. However, the association between abnormal (excess) D&O insurance coverage and the number of key audit matters is positive. Our results suggest that D&O insurance is associated with auditors' risk assessments. Auditors assess lower risks if firms obtain appropriate insurance coverage. In contrast, auditors might assess higher risks if firms carry excess coverage. This implies that greater managerial opportunism revealed by excess coverage might cause auditors to assess higher risks by issuing more key audit matters. |