財務報表盈餘品質對董監事暨重要職員責任保險與分析師盈餘預測關聯性之影響

The Impact of the Earnings Quality of Financial Statements on the Relation between the Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Analysts' Earnings

本研究目的在利用台灣上市櫃公司財務報表盈餘品質優劣區隔董監事暨重要職員責任保險之二對立觀點，探討不同盈餘品質次樣本內，公司投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險與分析師盈餘預測之關聯性。本研究實證發現，在公司盈餘品質不佳的組別，公司投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險金額愈高，分析師盈餘預測誤差與離散程度也愈大，支持董監事暨重要職員責任保險的經理人投機角色觀點，而非監督角色觀點，前述實證結果在若干敏感性測試之下仍具強韌性。

This study aims to use different earnings quality of Taiwan-listed companies' financial statements to differentiate the directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) two possible effects and explore the relationship between D&O insurance and analysts' earnings forecast in different earnings quality subsample. The empirical evidence suggests that only in the poor earnings quality subsample, the more D&O insurance increase analysts' earnings forecast error and earnings forecast dispersion. Our results support that higher D&O insurance induces managerial opportunism. The findings of this study are robust under several different specification tests.