公司政治關聯對購買董監事責任保險需求之影響

The Impact of Political Connection on Demand Purchases of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

本研究旨在探討企業之董事會成員結構之背景是否因為具有政治關聯因素，致影響到企業購買董監事責任保險（D&O責任保險）的需求。本研究根據董事會成員是否擔任過中央政府官員、民意代表及相關政黨工作等職位作為董事會政治關聯的主要變數。董事會成員分別就台灣2008年至2014年之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果發現，具有政治關聯董事會之企業可能透過政治尋租的方式取得較優惠的條件進而從事高風險行為，及經由政治關聯因素致造成公司治理體制薄弱，而增加違約及訴訟風險。若進一步區分政治關聯屬性為具有中央政府官員、民意代表與政黨黨職等三類，發現董事具有中央政府官員背景的公司，顯著易於購買D&O責任保險，且傾向於超額購買D&O責任保險，此表示董事成員擔任中央政府官員一職時，較易接觸政府施政核心，易透過政治關聯取得優惠政策，進而引發道德風險，誘使機會主義行為形成，因此會購買超額D&O責任保險來分擔訴訟風險。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the board member's political connection is associated with corporation's risk of litigation, and examines whether firms tend to purchase directors' and officers' liability insurance(hereafter D&O). In the study, the main issues are based on whether the members of the board of directors served as central government officials, representatives of political parties and related work and other positions as a political association. Using Taiwanese listed firms from year 2008 to 2014, we find that board member's political connection may obtain more favorable terms through political rent-seeking ways and increase financial leverage, engage in high-risk behavior, and increase the default and the risk of litigation and therefore have an incentive to purchase D&O liability insurance, and more insurance coverage. Future investigation shows that a company with a central government-related background director is easy to purchase D&O liability insurance and excess D&O liability insurance than public opinion representatives and political party positions, It means that members of the board of directors who serve as central government officials are likely to obtain preferential policies through political connections, which in turn leads to moral hazard and induces opportunistic behavior. Therefore, they will purchase excess D&O liability insurance to share the risk of litigation.