董監事法律責任保險訊息是否影響分析師盈餘預測品質

Do Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Signal the Quality of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

本研究主要目的係探討公司揭露董監事暨重要職員責任保險（D&O責任險）訊息是否會影響分析師盈餘預測品質。本文以臺灣2009年至2015年之上市櫃公司為研究樣本，實證結果發現，相較於未投保D&O責任險之公司，已投保D&O責任險之公司，其投保D&O責任險與分析師追蹤人次呈現顯著正向相關，而D&O責任險與分析師盈餘預測誤差及離散性則呈現顯著負向相關。研究結果支持公司投保於D&O責任險具有監督效果的訊息，有助於改善公司資訊揭露的品質及分析師盈餘預測的準確性。再者，考量樣本選擇性偏誤以控制內生性問題及投保超額D&O責任險金額後，仍獲得一致的結論。整體而言，本研究結果建議公司投保D&O責任險傳遞的監督效果大於道德危險問題，意旨其可增加分析師的盈餘預測品質以降低公司內外部資訊不對稱之風險。

The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the signal of Directors' and Officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate discourse affects the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts. Using publicly listed firms in Taiwan over the period from 2009 to 2015, our empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance compared to firms without D&O insurance have a significant and positive association between D&O insurance and analysts' coverage. Moreover, the errors and dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts are significantly negatively related to D&O insurance. This evidence supports the view that firms with insured D&O insurance convey the monitoring effects on improving the quality of information disclosure and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Further, we consider sample selection bias to control for potential endogeneity and test the abnormal amount of D&O insurance. Our results are still consistent. Overall, our findings suggest that the effective monitoring power is greater than moral hazard problems for firms with insured D&O insurance, implying the improved quality of analysts' earnings forecasts to reduce the risk of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders.