英文摘要 |
This research intends to focus on the discretion of public managers and examines the use of sanctions in holding contractors accountable for their performance. Currently, more and more public services around the world are paid for by governments but delivered by nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Contracting advocators, who often have roots in the field of public choice theory, champion contracting as a way to reduce service costs and enhance service efficiency through market competition. Contracting critics, who often have roots in traditional public administration fields, counter that contracting may reduce their capacity to produce services and manage service delivery. Despite the burgeoning literature acknowledging the importance of contract management and its seemingly significant contributions to the effectiveness of contract accountability, exploring the use of contract sanctions has rarely been attempted in contracting out and outsourcing studies. Against this background, an essential and intriguing question is whether and how much contracting agencies sanction contractors for unsatisfactory performance. Through semi-structured interviews with contract managers in local government, our results will contribute to the literature on ontract implementation and management capacity as well as better our understanding of how public contract managers use principal-agent theory and stewardship theory to consciously discern and overcome managerial challenges while facing contract sanctions being carried out in the public service. |