《精神現象學》中的意識之認知及其判準

The Cognition of Consciousness and Its Criterion in the Phenomenology of Spiri

本文首先指出黑格爾在《精神現象學》中主張認知主體、知識與絕對者不可分離，是以不同的意識之形態間的比較所需的判準，才成為一個問題。其次本文主張：作為認知的形式，一個意識之形態即為一種認知主體據以建構其實在的概念架構，從而意識之諸形態彼此不可共量。本文最後將說明黑格爾如何克服意識諸形態間的不可共量性，解決判準問題。

This paper will begin by arguing that Hegel insists upon the inseparability of the knowing subject, knowledge, and the absolute, so that there is for him the problem of the criterion required for a comparison of forms of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It will then be maintained that, as a form of knowing, a form of consciousness is nothing but the conceptual framework through which a certain type of knowing subject constructs the reality it inhabits. Forms of consciousness are thus incommensurable. At last, this paper will offer an account of how Hegel manages to overcome the incommensurability among forms of consciousness and solves the problem of the criterion.