總統國會制權力行使、支持基礎與民主運作

Power Enactment, Supporting Basis, and Democratic Operation in President-parliamentarism

本文主要的問題意識是為何有些總統國會制國家的總統在面對多元分歧的國會較容易逾越憲法的權限而進行單邊的獨裁統治，相反地為何有些總統國會制國家的總統卻選擇與國會妥協或讓步，透過權力分享來共治。本文主要的研究問題是總統國會制下，特定政治因素的配套如何促成總統國會制的總統選擇走上獨裁的道路，進而造成民主崩潰或是特定政治因素的結合如何讓總統國會制的總統之權力行使受到抑制，讓民主持續運作。本文的研究發現如下：當國會存在著固定反對多數和總統仍獲得國會少數支持的配套下會產生民主制衡，如烏克蘭的情形。當國會存在著固定反對多數與國會少數不支持總統兩個因素互動之後，較可能會產生總統去職的結果，如祕魯的情形。國會中浮動的反對多數和總統只獲得少數支持的結合，會產生總統和國會的政策僵局或是勢均力敵，如俄羅斯第二共和的情形。最後，國會中浮動的反對多數和少數不支持總統的連結，最容易產生民主崩潰的可能，如俄羅斯第一共和的瓦解。 The research question of this paper is to analyze how the combination of specific political contingencies entices the president to embark on dictatorship or restrains the president to encroach constitutional authority in president-parliamentary systems. First, when the majority of the opposition is stable and the force of supporting the president is relatively solid, then it can provide the mechanism of checks and balances to the ambitious president, such as the case in Ukraine. Second, as the majority of the opposition is staunch and the co-partisans of the president in the parliament are defecting, it is highly possible to produce the outcome of presidential breakdowns, as shown in Peru. Third, when the opposing majority is in flux and the supporting minority of the president is firm, it can cause policy deadlock on landmark bills like the situation in Russia during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1993-1999). Finally, when the opposing force is atomized and the supporting force of the president is feeble, the chance of democratic breakdown looms large as in the period of the Russian First Republic.